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Abstract 
The effect of corporate governance on firm performance has long been of great interest to financiers, economists, 
behavioural scientists, legal practitioners and business operators. Yet there is no consensus over what constitutes 
an effective corporate governance mechanism that induces agents or managers to consistently act in the interest 
of share value optimization. The purpose of this study is to investigate the role of corporate governance in 
mitigating agency cost in a sample of 9 service firms selected on the basis of market capitalization from Nairobi 
Securities Exchange during the period 2008-2012. We used the proxy asset utilization ratio to measure agency 
cost. Multivariate fixed effect regression is used to analyze the data. The explanatory variables include director 
ownership, institutional ownership, external ownership, board size, CEO/Chair duality, remuneration structure 
and board independence. The results show that higher director and institutional ownership reduces the level of 
agency cost. Smaller sized boards also results in lowering agency cost. Board independence has positive 
association with asset utilization ratio. The separation of the post of CEO and chairperson and higher 
remuneration lower agency cost. 
Keywords: Corporate governance, Agency cost, Multivariate fixed effect regression  
 
1. Introduction 
Corporate governance has become one of the most commonly used phrases in the current global business 
vocabulary. The notorious collapse of Enron in 2001, one of America’s largest companies, has focused 
international attention on company failures and the role that strong corporate governance needs to play to 
prevent them. The UK responded by producing the Higgs Report (2003) and the Smith Report (2003), whereas 
the US produced the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (2002). Nations around the world are instigating ‘far-reaching 
programmers’ for corporate governance reform, as evidenced by the proliferation of corporate governance codes 
and policy documents, voluntary or mandatory, both at the national and supra-national level. The phenomenal 
growth of interest in corporate governance has been accompanied by a growing body of academic research. As 
the discipline matures, far greater definition and clarity are being achieved concerning the nature of corporate 
governance. This study considers the broad ranging nature of corporate governance and its role in minimizing 
agency cost. 
 
Corporate governance is the broad term describes the processes, customs, policies, laws and institutions that 
directs the organizations and corporations in the way they act, administer and control their operations. It works to 
achieve the goal of the organization and manages the relationship among the stakeholders including the board of 
directors and the shareholders. It also deals with the accountability of the individuals through a mechanism 
which reduces the principal-agent problem in the organization. Corporate governance mechanisms are those 
mechanisms that protect shareholders interests. Country’s economic development improves with the help of 
good corporate governance. According to Core et al. (1999) companies will face higher problems of agency cost 
when they have week structure of corporate governance and in spite of maximizing firms value managers of such 
firms overindulge in personal pursuits. The Kenya code of corporate governance was published in year 2004 by 
the, Central Bank of Kenya, for the purpose of enhancing governance and transparency and to improve the 
disclosure in financial reporting of companies in order to protect the interests of companies investors. 
 
To the best of author knowledge, it is the first study done in Kenya in order to investigate the role of corporate 
governance in minimizing agency cost in the service sector. Cheema et al. (2003) has studied only the nature of 
ownership structure of corporations in Kenya, Ghani et al. (2002) examines business groups and their impact on 
corporate governance during 1998-2002. Hasan and Butt (2009) examine the impact of ownership structure and 
corporate governance on capital structure from 2002 to 2005. Ashraf and Ghani (2005) examine the origins, 
growth, and the development of accounting practices and disclosures in Kenya and the factors that influenced 
them. Mir and Nishat (2004), Shaheen and Nishat (2004), Tariq and Butt (2008), Javed and Iqbal (2006), Javed 
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and Iqbal (2010) and Humera Khatab et al. (2010) studied the relationship between corporate governance and 
firm performance. Therefore it is the first work done in the context of Kenya which address the agency problem 
and the role of corporate governance and ownership structure in limiting it, especially after the establishment of 
code of corporate governance in 2002. 
 
Limited research has been done in developed countries too, in the area of corporate governance. Furthermore, 
studies that have directly measured agency cost level and then determine factors that affect firm’s agency costs 
are few in number. Studies that have empirically examined the agency cost determinants and the influence of 
corporate governance on agency cost include, Ang et al. (2000) who have taken data from US non-listed 
companies, Singh and Davidson (2003) and Doukas, Kim and Pantzalis (2000) used a sample of large listed 
American firms, Fleming et al. (2005) and Darren Henry (2006) in the context of Australia, in UK companies 
Florackis and Ozkan (2004) during the period 1999 to 2003 and Doukas et al. (2005). 
 
As developing economy, Kenya’s governance practices are likely to be different from those of developed 
economies. According to Carcello et al. (2002) and Yatim et al. (2006) previous literature on corporate 
governance also argues that most of the work in this field has been done in developed countries and very little in 
developing countries, because their mechanisms of corporate governance is still evolving. 
 
The purpose of this article is to evaluate the effectiveness of mechanisms related to governance in minimizing or 
controlling the costs arises from agency problem within a sample of service companies listed in the Nairobi 
Securities Exchange, during 2008-2012. The study not only contributes in finding such factors that help in 
mitigating the problem of agency cost but also have implications for the corporate governance reform process in 
Kenya. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Theory of Corporate governance 
The subject may be treated in a narrow or a broad manner, depending on the viewpoint of the policy maker, 
practitioner, researcher or theorist. It seems that existing definitions of corporate governance fall along a 
spectrum, with ‘narrow’ views at one end and more inclusive, ‘broad’ views placed at the other. One approach 
toward corporate governance adopts a narrow view, where corporate governance is restricted to the relationship 
between a company and its shareholders. This is the traditional finance paradigm, expressed in ‘agency theory’. 
At the other end of the spectrum, corporate governance may be seen as a web of relationships, not only between 
a company and its owners (shareholders) but also between a company and a broad range of other ‘stakeholders’: 
employees, customers, suppliers, bondholders, to name but a few (Yatim, P, 2006). Such a view tends to be 
expressed in ‘stakeholder theory’. This is a more inclusive and broad way of treating the subject of corporate 
governance and one which is gradually attracting greater attention, as issues of accountability and corporate 
social responsibility are brought to the forefront of policy and practice in the UK and elsewhere. The consensus 
derives from a questionnaire survey that sampled a large number of UK institutional investors (Jill F Solomon & 
Aris Solomon, 2000). 
 
2.2 Agency Theory 
Agency costs represent important problems in corporate governance in both financial and nonfinancial 
industries. The separation of ownership and control in a professionally managed firm may result in managers 
exerting insufficient work effort, indulging in perquisites, choosing inputs or outputs that suit their own 
preferences, or otherwise failing to maximize firm value. In effect, the agency costs of outside ownership 
equalthe lost value from professional managers maximizing their own utility, rather than the value of the firm. 
Theory suggests that the choice of capital structure may help mitigate these agency costs. Under the agency costs 
hypothesis, high leverage or a low equity/asset ratio reduces the agency costs of outside equity and increases 
firm value by constraining or encouraging managers to act more in the interests of shareholders. Since the 
seminal paper by Jensen and Meckling (1976), a vast literature on such agency-theoretic explanations of capital 
structure has developed (see Harris and Raviv 1991 and Myers 2001 for reviews). Greater financial leverage may 
affect managers and reduce agency costs through the threat of liquidation, which causes personal losses to 
managers of salaries, reputation, perquisites, etc. (e.g., Grossman and Hart 1982, Williams 1987), and through 
pressure to generate cash flow to pay interest expenses (e.g., Jensen 1986). Higher leverage can mitigate 
conflicts between shareholders and managers concerning the choice of investment (e.g., Myers 1977), the 
amount of risk to undertake (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976, Williams 1987), the conditions under which the 
firm is liquidated (e.g., Harris and Raviv 1990), and dividend policy (e.g., Stulz 1990). 
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The introduction of limited liability and the opening up of corporate ownership to the general public through 
share ownership had a dramatic impact on the way in which companies were controlled. The market system in 
the UK and the USA, inter alia, is organized in such a way that the owners, who are principally the shareholders 
of listed companies, delegate the running of the company to the company management. There is a separation of 
ownership and control that has led to the notorious ‘agency problem’. Berle and Means (1932) discussed the 
extent to which there was a dispersion of shareholding, which consequently led to a separation of ownership and 
control in the USA. Prais (1976) showed that a similar structure of ownership and control operated in the UK. 
The agency problem was first explored in Ross (1973), with the first detailed theoretical exposition of agency 
theory presented in Jensen and Meckling (1976). They defined the managers of the company as the ‘agents’ and 
the shareholder as the ‘principal’ (in their analysis there is one shareholder versus the ‘managers’). In other 
words, the shareholder, who is the owner or ‘principal’ of the company, delegates day-to-day decision making in 
the company to the directors, who are the shareholder’s ‘agents’. The problem that arises as a result of this 
system of corporate ownership is that the agents do not necessarily make decisions in the best interests of the 
principal. One of the principal assumptions of agency theory is that the goals of the principal and agent conflict. 
In finance theory, a basic assumption is that the primary objective for companies is shareholder wealth 
maximization. In practice this is not necessarily the case. 
 
It is likely that company managers prefer to pursue their own personal objectives, such as aiming to gain the 
highest bonuses possible. Managers are likely to display a tendency towards ‘egoism’ (i.e., behavior that leads 
them to maximize their own perceived self-interest: Boatright, 1999). This can result in a tendency to focus on 
project and company investments that provide high short run profits (where managers’ pay is related to this 
variable), rather than the maximization of long-term shareholder wealth through investment in projects that are 
long-term in nature. 
 
Agency costs can manifest in various forms, including self-serving behavior on the part of managers focused on 
status or empire-building objectives, excessive perquisite consumption, non-optimal investment decision-making 
or acts of accounting mismanagement or corporate fraud. The adverse implications of these actions are then felt 
in the form of the destruction of shareholder wealth and wider impacts on other corporate stakeholders. The 
realization of the consequences flowing from the incidence of agency problems have led to emphasis being 
placed on the importance of competitive markets for managerial labor and corporate control as monitoring 
mechanisms designed to limit the degree of agency divergence, the role of institutional shareholders as substitute 
agency devices and the development and enforcement of codes of corporate governance practice to enhance 
director and management oversight and create desirable incentive structures within firms. The empirical 
literature on the role of corporate governance in mitigating agency cost is very limited. However, it is suggested 
that agency costs can be reduced by internal governance mechanisms and there is empirical evidence in support 
of this argument. 
 
2.3 Board Size 
Small boards were found less powerful and effective as compare to boards that are large in size in a study done 
by Pearce and Zahra (1991). This result is also supported by Singh and Davidson III (2003) by saying that the 
association between size of the board and asset utilization ratio is positive and statistically significant, 
furthermore they conclude that agency cost will be lower the greater the asset utilization ratio. In contrast 
Florackis and Ozkan (2004) in a study during 1999-2003 on a sample of UK public listed companies, found that 
size of board has a negative influence on agency cost proxy asset turnover, which means that the higher the size 
of the board the higher will be the agency costs because of less efficiency. Similarly (Beiner et al. 2004; and 
Eisenberg et al.1998) support the findings of Florackis and Ozkan’s (2004) with evidence that board size is 
negatively correlated with asset turnover. 
 
2.4 Board Independence 
Larger board independence is perceived as a monitory mechanism which can play an important role in limiting 
or controlling the agency problem. There are numerous studies in the literature which shed light on the role of 
independent directors and suggest that they are more likely to work for the shareholders interest such as Byrd 
and Hickman (1992), Brickley et al. (1994), Westphal and Zaiac (1995) and Borokkhovich et al. (1996). Similar 
results were found by McKnight and Mira (2003) and Henry (2004) concluding that agency costs will be lower 
the higher the number of independent directors on the board. On the contrary the findings of Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1991) and Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) suggest that board independence does not play a significant 
role in mitigating agency costs. Ang et al. (2000) also support the argument of Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) 
and Agrawal and Knoeber (1996). 
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2.5 CEO/Chair Duality 
It is strongly suggested in the literature that separating the post of CEO and chairperson will not only improve 
firm performance but also help in minimizing agency costs. However it is proposes by agency theory according 
to Fama and Jensen (1983) that in order to minimize agency cost the structure of leadership could not be 
separated. It was found that CEO/Chair duality does not impact agency costs McKnight and Mira (2003) and 
Florackis and Ozkan (2004). Mcknight and Weir (2008) in a study on UK public listed firms also finds that 
duality does not play an important role in mitigating agency cost. 
 
2.6 Remuneration Structure 
The next variable which is remuneration structure is proxied as taking natural log of the sum of the total annual 
benefits paid to all board members? It is predicted in the prior literature that the higher the remuneration of 
directors the lower will be the agency cost because these incentives will induce managers to work in the best 
interest of company shareholder in order to continuously receive these benefits and to protect their job security. 
However in contrast to the predictions made in the prior literature about the association between remuneration 
structure and agency cost Darren Henry (2006) found that the influence of remuneration structure on agency cost 
measure asset utilization ratio is negative, indicating that higher directors pay does not mitigate agency cost, on 
the other hand he found that remuneration structure has negative association with asset liquidity ratio suggesting 
that remuneration structure lowers agency cost. 
 
2.7 Managerial Ownership 
Agency costs will be reduced the higher the managerial ownership because when the ownership of managers in 
the firm increases it will result in the convergence of interests between company managers and shareholders as 
suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976) in the agency theory. Singh and Davidson (2003) also support the 
prediction of agency theory however he find week evidence that agency problem is minimized with increasing 
ownership of managers in the firm. 
 
2.8 Institutional Ownership 
Institutional shareholders play a key role in mitigating agency problem because they can monitor firm 
performance and action of managers and can influence managerial decision making. Furthermore,  institutional 
shareholders as shown by Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988) as compare to other shareholders vote more 
actively on anti-takeover amendments and work in the best interest of shareholders. According to Pound (1988) 
institutional investors as compare to private shareholders who are less informed can monitor managerial 
performance at lower cost because of greater expertise and resources. Henry (2004) also supports the findings of 
Pound (1988). In contrast, Doukas et al. (2000), and Mcknight and Weir (2008), show that agency cost is not 
influenced by institutional ownership.  According to Singh and Davidson (2003) outside block ownership do not 
appear to have a significant influence on agency cost. 
 
2.9 External Ownership 
The final variable of the study is external ownership which is measured as the sum of all individual 
shareholdings except managerial and institutional shareholdings. Similar to institutional shareholders other 
external substantial shareholders can also maximize their value by monitoring company performance, which will 
result in minimization of the agency costs. According to Darren Henry (2006) there is a negative influence on the 
dependent variable asset utilization ratio, but this association does not appear to be significant. Similar result was 
found by Singh and Davidson III (2003) in a study done in the context of US, concluding that external block 
holding does not have a significant impact on agency cost when it is measured in terms of discretionary expense 
ratio and asset utilization ratio. The reason according to Singh and Davidson III (2003) for the insignificant 
association between the explanatory variable external ownership and proxies of agency cost may be because 
these agency variables may not completely capture the performance metrics that are evaluated by the outside 
block holders when evaluating firm performance. 
 
 
 
 
3. Conceptual framework 
In this paper we have discussed all the important ingredients of which conceptual framework consists of (figure 
1), for example generation of the research hypothesis, variables Operationalization, design of research and 
limitations. 
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        Figure: 1 
 
3.1 Hypothesis 
H1: Agency costs will be lower when companies have boards that are small in size. 
H2: Companies will face lower agency costs when they have higher board independence. 
H3: Agency costs will be lower when companies have two different persons acting as a CEO and 
chairperson. 
H4: Agency costs decreases with increasing pay and bonuses of management. 
H5: At higher level of managerial ownership firm will have lower agency costs. 
H6: At higher level of institutional ownership agency costs will be lower. 
H7: Higher external ownership mitigate agency problem. 
 
4. Data and Operationalization of Variables 
The sample used in the study consists of top 9 service companies selected on the basis of market capitalization. 
We select companies which are listed in the Nairobi Securities Exchange and for which data is available on all 
variables. The period of the study consist of 4 years from 2008-2012. The data has been collected from NSE, 
Central Bank of Kenya and the Audited Annual Reports from companies’ official websites. Audited Annual 
Accounts of all the companies during 2008-2012 has been mostly considered for calculation of financial 
variables. Fixed effect multivariate regression analysis is used in order to examine the role of governance and 
ownership attributes in mitigating agency cost. 
 
4.1 Operationalization of Variables 
4.1.1 Dependent Variable 
Dependent variable of the study is agency cost, which is measured by using the proxy asset utilization ratio. 
 
4.1.1.1 Agency Cost 
The asset utilization ratio is used by following Ang, Cole and Wuh Lin (2000) and Singh and Davidson (2003). 
A higher asset utilization ratio indicates that companies are making investment decisions which are non-optimal 
or a second interpretation will be that companies are investing their funds in projects which are unproductive. It 
is defined as:  
 
Asset utilization ratio = total revenue/total assets 
 
4.1.2 Explanatory Variables 
The variables evaluated in this paper as potential determinants of agency cost levels can be categorized as 
representing ownership influences and corporate governance mechanisms. 
4.1.2.1 Director Ownership: Following Darren Henry (2006) we measured it as the percentage of total firm 
equity capital held by all company directors. 
4.1.2.2 Institutional Ownership: Following Darren Henry (2006) it is determined as the total percentage 
shareholding of all institutional shareholders. 
4.1.2.3 External Ownership: Following Darren Henry (2006) we define it as the sum of all individual non- 
institutional and non-director shareholdings. 
4.1.2.4 Board Size: Following Mir and Nishat (2004) we measure board size by taking natural log of all board 
members. 
4.1.2.5 Duality: Following Mcknight and Weir (2004) duality is included as a dummy variable which is given a 
value of 1 if the CEO is also the chairperson of the board of directors and 0 otherwise. 
4.1.2.6 Independent Directors: Following Darren Henry (2006) it is measured as the number of independent 
directors on the board relative to total number of board members. 
4.1.2.7 Remuneration structure: We measured this variable as taking natural log of the sum of total annual 
benefits paid to all members of the board. 
 
BRDSIZE 
DUALITY 
IND DIR 
REMSTR 
DIROW 
EXTOW 
INSOW 
AGENCY 
COST 
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5. Model Specification 
The technique used in the study to examine the link between governance and agency cost proxies is fixed effects 
multivariate regression analysis. This technique removes omitted variable bias and allows for controlling 
unobserved heterogeneity across the sample firms. The model specifications are as follows: 
 
Agency cost it = β0+ β1 (CEO- chair duality it) + β2 (Board independence it) +  
      β3 (Board size it) + β4 (Board remuneration it) +  
   β5 (Institutional ownership it) + β6 (External ownership it) +  
   β7 (Director Ownership it) + δi + ε it 
 
Where:  
Agency cost
 it = the dependent variable of the study, it represent asset utilization ratio for firm i  
         at period t. 
α = Intercept,  
δi = Firm-specific fixed effect, and 
εit = Error term 
 
6. Analysis And Results 
6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
In table 1 we have shown descriptive statistics for seven explanatory variables and agency cost proxy asset 
utilization ratio. The descriptive statistics include the median, mean, standard deviation, min and max values. 
The sample consists of 50 companies listed in the Nairobi Securities Exchange, during 2008-2012. The data has 
been taken from company’s annual reports, Nairobi Stock Exchange and Central Bank of Kenya. The results 
show that the mean asset utilization ratio is 0.7938, with a standard deviation of 0.5879. As for as corporate 
governance and ownership characteristics are concerned, the variable independent director has a mean value of 
0.1554, which indicate that the percentage of independent directors in company board of directors is 15.54%. 
The mean board size stood at 8 members with a standard deviation of 2.4365, whereas duality has a mean value 
of 0.1956 which means that sample companies in which CEO is also the chairperson of the board is less than 
20%. The number of shares held by company directors and institutions is 24.87% and 16.45% respectively of 
total equity capital. The average value of external ownership is 23.86% with a standard deviation of 27.81%. 
 
Table 1: Four Year Summary of Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Median SD Minimum Maximum 
Asset utilisation ratio 0.7938 0.5436 0.5879 0.0004 3.2145 
Independence 0.1554 0.1865 0.2756 0.0000 1.0000 
Duality 0.1956 0.0000 0.3881 0.0000 1.0000 
Board size 8.5478 7.0012 2.4365 4.0000 21.000 
Director ownership 0.2487 0.0865 0.1954 0.0000 0.8178 
Institutional ownership 0.1645 0.1435 0.1284 0.0000 0.5867 
External ownership 0.2386 0.1378 0.2781 0.0000 0.7976 
Remuneration (Ksh.000) 1979.6 1309.0 3245.3 11.000 55200.0 
 
6.2 Correlation Matrix 
The Pearson’s co-efficient of correlation is used in order to examine whether multicollinearity exist among the 
regressors or not, table 2 presents the results. Technique for detecting multicollinearity is through the use of a 
correlation matrix. Their will exist the problem of multicollinearity between explanatory variables when a 
serious correlation is found between them, but researchers do not agree that at what specific point a correlation 
will be considered as a high correlation. A correlation will be called as a high correlation when it exceeds 0.80 or 
0.90 according to Kennedy (1998). According to Brayman and Cramer (2001) when the correlation between any 
two variables is 0.80 or higher then they will have the problem of multicollinearity whereas 0.70 is used as a 
bench mark by Anderson et al. (1999) for serious correlation. Data for the whole sample is used to find 
correlations among explanatory variables using Pearson’s co-efficient of correlation which are shown in table 3. 
However it can be seen that there is no serious correlation between any two of the independent variables. 
 
After analyzing the Correlations between independent variables we find several observations which are 
noteworthy. First, it can be seen in table 2 that number of independent directors increases as institutional 
ownership increases however when managerial and external ownership increases board independence decreases. 
Similarly the CEO is not the chairperson of the board in companies where board independence and institutional 
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ownership is higher; in contrast companies with higher managerial ownership will have CEO working as 
chairperson of the board. Furthermore institutional ownership is less in companies where majority of shares is 
held by company directors or external shareholders, therefore such firms are exposed to higher agency problems. 
 
Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
 Ind dir Duality Board Size Dir.own Insown Extown Remstr 
Ind dir 1       
Duality -0.265 1      
Board Size 0.124 -0.044 1     
Dirown -0.045 0.467 -0.205 1    
Insown 0.348 -0.123 0.128 -0.035 1   
Extown -0.267 -0.006 -0.165 -0.132 -0.078 1  
Remstr 0.066 0.041 0.365 -0.029 0.124 -0.164 1 
 
Note: Ind dir = Independent directors, Dirown= Director ownership, Insown= Institutional  
         ownership, Extown= external ownership, Remstr= remuneration structure 
 
6.3 Regression Results 
The results of fixed effect multivariate regression analysis are presented in table 1, with asset utilization ratio as 
the dependent variable. The model as a whole is significant in explaining variation in the dependent variable. R-
square is 0.458 which means that the seven independent variables explain 45% variation in the dependent 
variable asset utilization ratio. Firm-specific fixed effects are also highly significant, indicating substantial firm 
heterogeneity across sample firms. The result shows that variable director ownership and asset utilization ratio 
have strong positive correlation. The reason is that the higher the director’s shareholding in the company the 
more closer will be their wealth and decision making interest with that of company shareholders. Thus as a result 
the agency cost will be reduced. Our result is against the findings of Singh and Davidson III (2003) who found 
that director ownership has negative association with asset utilization ratio. However when they measure agency 
cost as discretionary expense ratio the result becomes insignificant. However, Mustapha and Ahmad (2001) 
found that higher director ownership reduces agency costs. Hence the hypothesis that higher director ownership 
will lower agency cost will be accepted. 
 
Similarly, institutional ownership has significant positive influence on asset utilization ratio. Institutional 
investors monitor the decision making and performance of the firm, effective monitoring align the interest of 
shareholders with that of the owners, resulting in mitigation of agency cost. Thus we will accept the hypothesis 
that higher institutional shareholding will reduce agency cost. Henry (2004) also found that agency costs will be 
lower the higher the institutional shareholdings. In contrast, Doukas et al. (2000) and Mcknight and Weir (2008) 
show that agency cost is not influenced by institutional ownership. However external ownership did not have any 
significant influence on agency cost. Similar result was found by Darren Henry (2006) while taking asset 
utilization ratio as the dependent variable. Singh and Davidson III (2003) also do not find any significant impact 
on agency cost when it is measured in terms of discretionary expense ratio and asset utilization ratio. 
 
As for the variables related to corporate governance are concerned, most of them have significant influence on 
asset utilization ratio. For example it can be seen in table 1 that asset utilization ratio enhanced significantly by 
increasing the number of independent directors on the board and with smaller size boards. The justification for 
the negative association between the explanatory variable board size and the asset utilization ratio may be that 
smaller size boards, in making decisions are more effective and organizationally functional as compare to larger 
boards, furthermore it is rather more easy for top management for example Chief Executive Officer to control 
smaller board of directors. Hence boards with small size are therefore having lower agency costs. Our result is 
consistent with the findings of Ibrahim and abdul samad (2006), they also found that smaller board size play a 
significant role in lowering agency costs. In contrast, Pearce and Zahra (1991) and Florackis and Ozkan (2004) 
found that larger boards mitigate agency costs as compare to smaller boards. 
 
The company with larger number of independent directors will have lower agency costs because independent 
directors have a significant influence on the performance of the firm. Independent directors not only protect the 
interest of shareholders but also monitor decision making of company’s management. Thus we will accept our 
hypothesis that agency cost decreases with smaller boards and increasing the number of independent directors. 
Similar results were found by McKnight and Mira (2003) and Henry (2004) that board independence lowers 
agency costs. In a study on data taken from Malaysian family and non-family ownership firms Ibrahim and abdul 
samad (2006) conclude that there is no significant association between agency cost and independent directors 
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when it comes to companies from family ownership, but in contrast independent directors minimize agency costs 
in non-family ownership. Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Ang et al. (2000) and 
Singh and Davidson III (2003) found that independent directors does not influence agency costs. 
 
The association of variable CEO/Chair duality with asset utilization ratio is negative and statistically significant. 
Firms with same person acting as both a CEO and Chairman will increase the influence of a single person on the 
decision making of the board of directors, resulting in a higher agency problem. Thus the hypothesis that 
separation of the post of CEO and chairperson will lower agency cost stands. Ibrahim and abdul samad (2006) 
found that in family ownership firms agency cost decreases when duality role exist, on the other hand agency 
costs rises when duality role exists in non-family ownership. It was found that CEO/Chair duality does not 
impact agency costs McKnight and Mira (2003), Florackis and Ozkan (2004) and Mcknight and Weir (2008). 
Consistent with prior literature remuneration of board of directors has positive relation with asset utilization 
ratio, which means that higher pay to managers results in raising firm performance and reducing agency cost. 
Thus we will accept our hypothesis. 
 
Table 3 
The results of fixed effect regression of the determinants of agency cost for the duration of four years from 2003- 
2006. The dependent variable is the asset utilization ratio. Explanatory variables are related to corporate 
governance. 
 
Variables Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
Intercept 0.322 4.052* 0.0000 
Director ownership 0.112 3.41* 0.0007 
Institutional ownership 0.002 2.94* 0.0080 
External ownership 1.183 0.637 0.0138 
Board size -0.514 -3.092* 0.0060 
Duality -0.017 -4.46* 0.0000 
Independence 0.019 3.96 0.0001 
Remuneration structure 0.010 2.566** 0.0190 
R-square 0.452   
F-statistic 8.470   
Fixed effect significance 58.254   
*Significant at 1% level 
**Significant at 5% level 
7. Conclusion 
The paper attempts to examine the role of corporate governance in mitigating agency cost on a sample of 9 
randomly selected service firms listed in the Nairobi Securities Exchange during the period 2008-2012. We used 
the proxy asset utilization to measure agency cost. Multivariate fixed effect regression is used to analyze the 
data. Explanatory variables consist of governance and ownership related attributes such as director ownership, 
external ownership, and institutional ownership, size of board of directors, CEO/Chair duality, and remuneration 
structure and board independence. The results show that higher director and institutional ownership reduces the 
level of agency cost. Smaller size boards also results in lowering agency cost and the variable board size have 
significant negative association with asset utilization ratio. Board independence has positive association with 
asset utilization ratio. The separation of the post of CEO and chairperson and higher remuneration lower agency 
cost when asset utilization ratio was the dependent variable. 
 
7.1 Limitations of the Study 
The research conducted in this study has the following limitations: 
1) In fact, more work is required in the area of pre-board selection tests, and an accreditation system that 
Guarantees at least some fundamental levels of skill, knowledge and experience. 
2) The study only covers data of firms that are listed in the, Nairobi Stock exchange, for the last four years 
2008-2012, and therefore does not represent time period beyond this. 
3) The study only focus on firms listed on the NSE and therefore does not represent unlisted companies. 
Furthermore, the study also excluded financial firms due to their unique ownership and governance 
structure. 
4) Firms had to be a KSE listed company for the period of four years in order to meet the criteria for 
inclusion in the sample. This might have resulted in sample bias Zikmund (2003). 
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7.2 Suggested Future Research 
Based on the limitations and findings of current research, the following recommendations can be made for future 
research: 
1) In order to find out the association of agency cost with some other types of structure of ownership for 
Example family ownership and public sector firms which is unique in Kenya, research in the future 
needs to make a difference between family and non-family ownership. 
2) The researcher needs to include more years of data in order to extend the study and add some control 
Variables like leverage, growth, risk and size of the firm to investigate their role in mitigating agency 
cost. 
3) Furthermore, those who want to study the impact of governance on agency cost in the future needs to 
cover financial sectors, which will not only extend this study but also the results, will become more 
effective. 
4) In order to investigate whether the level of agency cost is affected by the existence of nonlinear 
ownership, the researchers in the field of corporate finance needs to re-estimate the above model after 
including squared terms for the external and director ownership variables. 
 
References 
Agrawal, A. and C.R. Knoeber, (1996). Firm performance and mechanisms to control agency problems 
betweenmanagers and shareholders, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 31: 377-397. 
Ang, J.S., R.A. Cole and J. Wuh Lin, (2000). Agency costs and ownership structure, Journal of Finance. 55: 81-
106. 
Beiner, S., Drobetz, W., Schmid, F. and Zimmermann, H. (2004). An Integrated Framework of Corporate 
Borokhovich, K. A., Parrino, R., & Trapani, T. (1996). Outside directors and CEO selection. Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis. 31(3): 337–355. 
Brickley, J. A., Coles, J. L., & Terry, R. L. (1994). Outside directors and the adoption of poison pills. Journal of 
Financial Economics. 34: 371–390. 
Brickley, J., Lease, R. C., & Smith, C. W. (1988). Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments. 
Journal of Financial Economics. 20: 267–291. 
Byrd, J. W., & Hickman, K. A. (1992). Do outside directors monitor managers? Journal of Financial Economics. 
32: 195–221. 
Carcello, J.V., Hermanson, D.R., Neal, T.L. and Riley, R.A. (2002). Board characteristics and audit fees”, 
characteristics, International Review of Financial Analysis. 14: 493-507. 
Cheema, A. (2003). Corporate governance in Kenya; Issues and Concerns. The Journal. 8: 7–19, NIPA, 
Cheema, A., F. Bari, and O. Saddique (2003). Corporate Governance in Kenya: Ownership, Control and the 
Law. Lahore University of Management Sciences, Lahore. Contemporary Accounting Research. 19(3): 
365-84. 
Dalton, D.R., C.M. Daily, A.E. Ellstrand and J.L. Johnson, (1998). Meta-analytic reviews of board composition, 
leadership structure and financial performance, Strategic Management Journal. 19: 269-290. 
Doukas, J.A., C. Kim and C. Pantzalis, (2000). Security analysis, agency costs and company characteristics, 
Financial Analysts Journal. 56: 54-63. 
Doukas, J.A., P.J. McKnight and C. Pantzalis, (2005). Security analysis, agency costs and UK firm 
Eisenberg, T., Sundgren, S., and Wells, M. (1998). Larger Board Size and Decreasing Firm Value in Small 
Firms, Journal of Financial Economics. 48: 35-54 
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics. 26: 
327–349. 
Finance, and Investment, (University of Chicago Press, Chicago). 149-180. 
Fleming, G., R. Heaney and R. McCosker (2005). Agency costs and ownership structure in Australia, Pacific- 
Basin Finance Journal. 13: 29-52. 
Florackis, C. and Ozkan A. (2004). Agency Costs and Corporate Governance Mechanisms: Evidence for UK 
Firms, Working Paper, University of York, UK. 49(2): 139-58. 
Gani, W. I. and J. Ashraf (2005). Corporate Governance, Business Group Affiliation and Firm Performance: 
Descriptive Evidence from Kenya. Lahore University of Management Sciences. (CMER Working Paper 
No 05-35). 
Governance and Firm Valuation: Evidence from Switzerland, ECGI paper 34/2004 
Henry, D., (2004). Corporate governance and ownership structure of target companies and the outcome of 
Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (1991). The effects of board composition and direct incentives on firm 
performance. Financial Management. 21: 101–112. 
Humera Khatab et al. (2010). Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: A Case study of Karachi Stock 
Market International Journal of Trade, Economics and Finance. 2(1): February, 2011 2010-023X 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.5, No.12, 2014 
 
154 
 
Ibrahim (2006). Corporate governance in Kenya: Analysis of current challenges and recommendations for future 
reforms Washington university global studies law review VOL. 5:323 
Iqbal, Robina (2006). Corporate Ownership Structure and Firm Performance; Evidence from Kenyai Listed 
Companies. M Phil Dissertation, Economics Department, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. 
Javid, Attiya Y. and Robina Iqbal (2009). Ownership Concentration, Corporate Governance and Firm 
Jensen, M.C. and Meckling, W.H. (1976). Theory of the firms: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership 
structure, Journal of Financial Economics. 3(4): 305-60. 
McKnight, P.J. and Mira, S. (2003). Corporate Governance Mechanisms, Agency Costs and Firm Performance 
in UK Firms,  
McKnight, P.J. and Weir, C. (2009). Agency costs, corporate governance and ownership structure in large UK 
publicly quoted companies: a panel data analysis, The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance. 
mechanisms, Journal of Banking and Finance. 27: 793-816. 
Mir, Shahid and Mohammad Nishat (2004). Corporate Governance Structure and Firm Performance in 
Kenya:An Empirical Study. Paper presented at Second Annual Conference in Corporate Governance. 
Lahore University of Management Sciences, Lahore. 
Pearce, J.A. and Zahra, S.A. (1991). The Relative Power of CEOs and Boards of Directors: Association with 
Corporate Governance, Strategic Management Journal. 12: 135-18 
Performance: Evidence from Kenya. The Kenya Development Review 48:4. 
Pound, J. (1988). Proxy contests and the efficiency of shareholder oversight. Journal of Financial Economics. 20: 
237–265. 
Prowse, S.D., (1990). Institutional investment patterns and corporate financial behavior in the United States and 
Japan, Journal of Financial Economics. 27: 43-66. 
Shaheen, Rozina and Mohammad Nishat (2005). Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: An Exploratory 
Analysis. Paper presented in the Conference of Lahore School of Management Sciences, Lahore. 
Singh, M. and W.N. Davidson III, (2003). Agency costs, ownership structure and corporate governance 
takeover bids’, Pacific-Basin Finance Journal. 12: 419-444. 
Weir, C., D. Laing and P.J. McKnight, (2002) Internal and external governance mechanisms: Their impact on the 
performance of large UK public companies, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting. 29: 579-611. 
Westphal, J. and Zaiac, E. (1995). Who Shall Govern? CEO/Board Power, Demographic Similarty, and New 
Director Selection, Administrative Science Quarterly. 40: 60-83 
Yatim, P., Kent, P. and Clarkson, P. (2006). Governance structures, ethnicity, and audit fees of Malaysian listed 
firms, Managerial Auditing Journal. 21(7): 757-82. 
